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I.

Introduction

International labor standards are among the oldest international standards
pertaining to the conduct of private, as well as public, economic actors. They long
predate the post-World War II body of international human rights instruments. The
International Labour Organization (ILO), the international organization under whose
auspices most international labor standards have been promulgated, dates back to 1919
and the era of the League of Nations.1
Far from being settled, however, nearly every aspect of the current international
labor standards regime is in flux: the role of labor standards in the international legal,
economic, political, and social order, as well as in the parallel domestic orders; the modes
by which standards are brought into being; the manner and means of their
implementation and enforcement; the degree to which they may be binding solely on
nation-state parties, and enforceable only at their behest; and the extent to which private
actors, such as employer associations, trade union associations, worker rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals, play roles in the creation and
enforcement of international labor norms. Although the substantive content of
international labor standards is changing at a far less blistering pace, important alterations
in priorities for these standards also gradually are becoming manifest. Predicting the
future of international labor standards in such a dramatically shifting environment may be
a sufficiently hazardous occupation to itself require a protective labor standard.
Needless to say, these developments are not happening in a vacuum. They should
be placed in the surrounding context of similar changes in the overall international legal
order. The changes in standard setting, implementation and enforcement as to
international labor measures are part and parcel of the rapidly shifting landscape for
adoption and implementation of international instruments of all types.
The international legal regime changes are in turn influenced by and in their turn
influence the massive technological change of the past few decades; accelerating
economic integration and globalization; vastly expanded cross-border mobility of goods,
services, direct investment capital, portfolio capital, and people; and intensified
international competition in the markets for goods, services, capital and labor. The
international political landscape also provides a moving target, interacting with these
economic and legal factors. Varying degrees of regional political integration are shifting
the locus of political authority upwards, particularly within Europe. Simultaneously,
contradictory, albeit spotty pressures toward political disintegration are occurring,
variously including downward devolution of authority in countries such as the United
Kingdom, and threatened break-up into sub-units of nation-states composed of

historically distinct ethnic or linguistic populations, including the former Yugoslavia,
Spain, Belgium, and Canada. In the developing world, some nation-states are dissolving
into tribal warfare or anarchy.
The international labor standards field stands at the intersection, buffeted by
cross-cutting pressures, a part of, yet distinct from these developments. It is uniquely
economic and social simultaneously, with aspects of human rights and trade and
economic law. Labor is, after all, a factor of production, yet not a commodity; in this, the
American Clayton Act of 19142 and the ILO Declaration of Philadelphia of 19443 are in
accord. Unlike typical “first generation” international human rights – civil and political
rights which involve claims of individuals as against governmental action – labor rights
involve claims related to conduct of private employers as well as the state. They thus
pose unique problems as to implementation and enforcement. Norms set by international
labor standards effectively must be transmitted through at least two layers of policymaking to reach their aim of affecting workplace conditions: first, the nation-state legal
and regulatory level, and second, the employer or collective bargaining labor practicesetting level.4
At the same time, labor rights are quite distinct from typical “second generation”
human rights – economic and social rights such as the right to health care, education,
social welfare provision, or retirement income security. Second generation rights pose
special issues because they involve affirmative claims upon nation-state treasuries. Labor
rights, on the other hand, entail governmental budgetary allocation only to the extent of
governmental labor inspectorate or enforcement agency funding, leaving aside their
impact on the government in its capacity as public employer. Instead, labor standards
obligate government expenditure of internal political capital. Moreover, they restrain
governments from using reduction of domestic labor standards below international
minima as a means of competing in international markets to attract and retain
internationally-mobile capital, or as an indirect subsidy for the production of domestic
goods and services, to artificially enhance their international competitiveness.
This article will sketch out the historical trajectory of transformation in the
manner and means, participants and roles involved in creation, implementation and
enforcement of international labor standards, as well as their content. This will lay a
foundation for some remarks about their future. Of necessity, it will paint a picture in
very broad strokes. The next section will briefly examine the history of international
labor norm-setting. Section III will outline the current state of affairs. It will conclude
with some speculative rumination about the future.
II.

Past as Prologue

It would be an oversimplification to say that throughout much of the twentieth
century, the nation-state had a near-monopoly over the creation, implementation, and
enforcement of international law. For most purposes, however, this simplified
characterization would suffice. There is a reason, after all, that the field was initially
dubbed “the law of nations.”

The glaring exception is the process of creation of labor standards within the ILO.
From its inception, the ILO was built upon a tripartite structure, in which member nationstate governments were entitled to name two representatives of their own, plus one
representative each for the country’s trade union movement and employer association.5
The Member State governments have always been required to nominate the labor and
management delegates “in agreement with” the peak organizations which are “most
representative of employers or workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective
countries.”6 The notion of functional democracy, of participation in standard setting as
well as supervision of implementation by representatives of the two main sides in
economic and social policy – labor and management – has been applied consistently
throughout the ILO system in the course of its existence.
A. The Standard Setting Process
Under the ILO Constitution, international labor standard setting may take two
forms: Conventions and Recommendations.7 Both are adopted by a two-thirds majority
vote of the delegates present at the International Labour Conference, the annual general
assembly of the four delegates from each Member State.8 Labor and management
delegates are not subject to instruction by their home government.9
Adoption of a Convention by the body obligates the government of each Member
State promptly to present the instrument to its proper authorities for ratification, and to
report back to the ILO on whether the country has ratified it.10 A Convention then
becomes binding upon the State upon ratification. This obligates the government to bring
its domestic law into conformity with the convention and to ensure domestic
implementation. A Member State which does not ratify is not bound to implement the
Convention, but it is required to report periodically on its domestic implementation of the
substance of the instrument.11 As to Recommendations, the Member States commit to
bringing the international prescription to the attention of their governmental authorities
“for their consideration with a view to effect being given it by national legislation or
otherwise,” but they have no obligation to implement the terms.12 They must, however,
report periodically on implementation of the substance of the Recommendation.13
Traditional ideas of Member State sovereignty, particularly the understanding that
a country would be bound on the international plane only as to instruments to which it
had individually consented, were thus bent but not broken by the ILO “legislative”
structure. The multilateral negotiation of ILO instruments has always involved active
participation by the business and worker sides, along with government delegates. This
opening to participation by and formal allocation of voting rights to non-governmental
actors has remained a rarity in international organizations. The ILO scheme has blazed
the path for the most prominent modern example, the role of the social partners in
developing labor and other social legislation in the European Union’s processes.14
Nevertheless, the Member States have retained ultimate individual control over whether
their country would be bound by any ILO Convention, since each has remained free not
to ratify, and each retains formal freedom of action as to Recommendations.

Dilution of the Member States’ governmental legislative monopoly power did not
occur by accident. It happened in response to crisis.
[During negotiation for the peace treaty at the conclusion of World War I,
a] revolutionary temper was widespread: the Bolshevik revolution in
Russia had been followed by the regime of Béla Kun, in Hungary; the
shop steward movement in Great Britain had honeycombed many of the
larger trade unions and undermined the authority of their constitutional
executives; the trade union movements in France and Italy showed signs
of becoming more and more extremist; millions of men, trained in the use
of arms, to whom extravagant promises had been freely made were about
to be demobilized; the wave of unrest had spread even to such stable and
peaceful democracies as the Netherlands and Switzerland. How gravely
the situation was viewed may be indicated by the fact that during the
Peace Conference itself Clemenceau moved many thousands of troops into
Paris as a precaution against rioting in the streets.
* * * In other circumstances it is indeed highly probable that some
of the more daring innovations in [the details of the proposed
organization], such as the provision that non-Government delegates should
enjoy equal voting power and equal status with Government delegates in
the International Labour Conference, would have been considered
unacceptable.15
The employer and worker side representatives to the ILO were intended from the
outset to be independent of government, and loyal instead to their respective capital and
labor interests. 16 However, it quickly became evident that the extent to which this formal
structure could be fulfilled in practice depended upon the degree to which, in any given
country, a free and non-governmentally controlled business sector was present, as well as
a trade union or other organized worker representation movement existing independent of
both government and employer domination. 17
The ILO standard-setting model thus differs from the approach to adoption of
instruments by the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly in two dimensions: the
make-up of the body and its legislative process, on the one hand, and the nature of the
instruments, on the other. The tripartite functional representation as part of the ILO goes
some way to cure the democratic deficit embedded in most international organizations.
That democratic deficit is an amalgam of the lack of internal democracy in many Member
States, couples with the inherent incompatibility with any idea of “one person, one vote”
or representation in proportion to population with the normal international organization
rule of one nation-state, one vote.
The second difference is the nature of the instruments themselves. The ILO has
always designed its instruments – not only the binding Conventions, but the non-binding
guidance instruments, the Recommendations – to be “legislative in character.” They are

all intended to provide definite terms for transposition to domestic Member State law or
regulation. ILO officials regularly refer to ILO instruments as “international labor
legislation,” and to the corpus of Conventions and Recommendations as constituting an
“international labor code. ILO instruments “represent something very different from, and
something much more difficult to formulate than the resolutions frequently adopted by
[the U.N. and similar] international bodies which aim only at arriving at a collective
opinion on some restrictive though possibly very important issue.”18
B.

The Process for Implementation and Monitoring for
Compliance with ILO Standards

The ILO has pioneered the creation of a routinized, formalized system for
inducing Member State fulfillment of the obligations they have assumed under ILO
processes, again incorporating tripartite participation.19 Each Member State must report
to the ILO annually on “the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provisions
of Conventions to which it is a party.”20 These reports are reviewed by a committee of
independent experts, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations.21 The Committee of Experts drafts comments, including observations
as to the degree of compliance of the Member State’s law and practice with its
obligations under the Conventions it has ratified. Its comments are compiled in an annual
report. When the Committee of Experts has found that the Member State may have failed
to fully apply a ratified convention, the Conference Committee on the Application of
Standards, a tripartite committee of the International Labour Conference, reviews the
experts’ report, and may hold a public forum with participation by the Member State.
The Conference Committee then drafts and submits a report on such cases to the annual
Conference, with a special section devoted to cases of persistent failure.22 As previously
noted, Member States also must report at intervals specified by the ILO Governing Body
on their activities to implement the substance of unratified Conventions and
Recommendations; the Committee of Experts reviews and reports on these as well.23
A separate, more intense procedure handled by the Governing Body Committee
on Freedom of Association, another tripartite body, responds to the volume of claims of
Member State failure to fully implement workers’ right to freedom of association and
collective bargaining, the principle of which is deemed binding on all Member States on
the basis of the ILO Constitution.24 Under still other special procedures, trade unions and
employer associations may submit to the ILO a “representation” claiming that a Member
State “has failed to secure in any respect the effective observance within its jurisdiction
of any Convention to which it is a party,”25 and one Member State may submit a
complaint of violation by another Member States of its ILO obligations.26 This type of
complaint may trigger more serious procedures, including the establishment of a
Commission of Inquiry to conduct factfinding and recommend a resolution, with possible
resort to the International Court of Justice.27
The ILO’s effort to build in a regular, obligatory process for governments to
engage in self-reflection and reporting on their compliance, subject to review by
committee of legal experts, has been widely copied, with adaptive modifications in many

other international regimes. It has been especially influential in the development of U.N.
agencies overseeing international human rights instruments such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)28 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).29 Some similar elements also appear in
the supervisory processes of international economic regimes such as that of the World
Trade Organization.30 The possibility of submission of complaints of violations by
Member States is another ILO innovation emulated, albeit for the most part, in weakened
form, by other international human rights bodies. In the course of adaptation, however,
other international organizations have eliminated or watered-down the role of trade union
bodies, employer associations and other NGOs in the monitoring process. The notion of
expert committees, on the other hand, to assess the legal technicalities of compliance has
widely emulated.
C.

The Substance of the International Standards

One can chart important changes in the priorities of ILO labor legislation in
different eras, both in terms of specially-protected categories of workers as well as in
substantive focus. During the founding period, from 1919 until the Declaration of
Philadelphia in 1944, underage workers were a primary focus of ILO legislation during
its first two decades, although much of its covered only certain industries, occupations, or
narrowly selected working conditions.31 It was only in 1973, that the core labor
convention requiring ratifying countries to set an across-the-board minimum age for child
labor was adopted.32 The other core convention, prohibiting the worst, most dangerous
and most exploitative forms of child labor, did not gain enactment until the present
period, in 1999.33
Apart from child labor, the greatest attention in the early period of the ILO for a
discrete class of workers was addressed to women workers. The ILO adopted measures
excluding women from exposure to occupational health and safety hazards such as lead
poisoning, from occupations such as underground work, and from night time work, and
also enacted a series of protective instruments regarding pregnancy and maternity, all
predicated on women’s presumed fragility as well as their expected role as caretaker
within the family.34 Despite some lip service to equality for women, however, no ILO
instruments were adopted to ensure equality of remuneration, employment, access to
employment or training for women until the 1950s.35 The major social security
convention adopted in 1952, remained predicated upon the then-dominant, male
breadwinner model.36 The equality conventions remained in tension with protective labor
measures targeting women workers, maternity, and female family responsibilities. In the
last two decades of the twentieth century, the ILO finally embraced gender equality. In
1981, a gender neutral instrument displaced earlier ones supporting “workers with family
responsibilities.”37 In 1990 a protocol to the 1948 Night Work (Women) Convention and
a mostly gender-neutral Night Work Convention were adopted.38 Other pieces of
modern, gender neutral ILO legislation aimed at improving the position of women in the
labor market include 1994 measures regarding part-time workers, and 1996 instruments
regarding home-based workers.39

In terms of conditions of work, too, the focus of ILO legislation has shifted
considerably over time. In its early years, wages40 and working time received the most
attention, leading up to the convention establishing the forty-hour week.41 Occupational
health and safety measures, in addition to those limiting working time,42 and measures
fragmentarily providing for social security and social insurance of workers, were enacted
during this time.43 Convention No. 29, the Forced Labour Convention, and two
accompanying recommendations were adopted in 1930. In 1957, Convention No. 105,
Abolition of Forced Labour completed the ILO’s legislation on this subject.
Little was done, however, regarding collective bargaining and industrial relations
in the inter-war period. A strong emphasis on industrial relations may be seen throughout
the post-World War II era until the late 1980s.44 Besides the core labor rights instruments
on freedom of association, the right to organize and collective bargaining, measures were
adopted regarding collective bargaining in the public as well as private sectors, for
protection of workers’ representatives, and for tripartite national level consultations on
labor laws and industrial relations policy.45 A 1952 comprehensive convention was
adopted setting minimum standards for social security and social insurance in nine
separate dimensions of worker earnings protection against risk.46 Job security was also
emphasized through the 1980s as critically important to workers and their
representatives.47
Of the eight conventions today considered to encompass core labor standards,
only Convention No. 29 prohibiting forced labor, dates back to the initial era, and only
one, Convention No. 182, Worst Forms of Child Labor, was enacted in 1999, post-dating
this second period. The other six include Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association
and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948), Convention No. 98, Right to Organise
and Collective Bargaining (1949), Convention No. 105, Abolition of Forced Labour
(1957), Convention No. 100, Equal Remuneration (1951), Convention No. 111,
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) (1958), and Convention No. 138,
Minimum Age (1973). Together these cover the four areas of ILO labor rights
considered to constitute as fundamental human rights: freedom of association,
prohibition against forced labor, nondiscrimination in occupation, employment and
remuneration, and child labor.
D.

Influence of the ILO Legislation on Law and Practice

The key question as to international instruments, including those of the ILO, must
be the extent to which they influence national domestic law, and governmental and
employer practice in fulfilling the rights ostensibly created for workers. Here, it could be
said, the ILO’s record is mixed, although better than that of most international
organizations.
It seems clear that the ILO system of obligation, reporting and monitoring has
been fairly effective at inducing Member States formally to adopt legislation
transplanting the provisions of many Conventions or modifying prior law to bring it into
compliance. Moreover, ratification of a Convention often influences a Member State

government by preventing subsequent lowering of its domestic labor standards. Even
unratified Conventions and non-binding Recommendations have a strong influence. One
can find national legislative provisions in a vast number of countries plainly modeled on
the template created by particular ILO instruments, which serve a role similar to that of
model codes in the development of American domestic law in fields dominated by state
legislation.
Case studies have confirmed the leading influence of ILO standards on positive
law adopted by developed and developing countries alike. The ILO reporting and
supervision process has been fairly effective at detecting failures to bring domestic
legislation into formal compliance with ratified conventions and in motivating countries
to modify their laws to become compliant. 48 Technical assistance provided by the ILO to
developing countries has furthered this trend.49 Moreover, ILO standards influence the
terms of collective bargaining agreements, whether labor contracts occupy a place
equivalent to legislation in the national industrial relations order or simply apply between
the employer and trade union parties.50
Finally, ILO instruments have strongly influenced the enactment of labor rights
provisions in universal human rights instruments addressing the same topics under the
auspices of the United Nations, regional human rights provisions such as those in the
European Social Charter and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, as well
as labor rights provisions in the foundational treaty of the European Community.51 These
international instruments, in turn, further pressure and support national governments in
incorporating similar content into domestic law.
Three major areas of relative failure had become apparent, however, by the mid1990s. First, the ILO has been less effective in persuading non-ratifying countries to
ratify and bind themselves by many duly enacted ILO conventions, including some of the
most fundamental ones. Second, the ILO supervision process has been far less successful
at addressing failure to effectively implement the principles established in ILO norms,
once national legislation has been adopted in formal compliance with the ILO standard.
Problems arise as to Member State enforcement of its domestic implementing legislation,
particularly when countries rely on labor inspectorates or other government-initiated
enforcement rather than worker or trade union-instituted enforcement litigation.
Difficulties also are caused by systemic failures in the rule of law, including corruption
and incompetence, among both inspectors and adjudicatory bodies. Third, it has become
progressively harder to gain enactment of binding Conventions within the ILO, since
heightened opposition by employer delegates leads to substitution of non-binding
Recommendations or to the enactment of nothing at all.52 These flaws remain the
Achilles heels of the ILO system as well as other international regimes involving labor
rights, although the ILO has pursued major new initiatives in an effort to respond to these
problems.
III.

On the Edge: Present Trends Destabilizing Established
Regimes and Speculations for the Future

A.

The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Rights

A major innovation by the ILO in the mid-1990s was the organization’s adoption
of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and the Follow-up
to the Declaration, which creates a special reporting and monitoring system for labor
rights designated as fundamental – freedom of association and collective bargaining,
forced labor, nondiscrimination, and child labor. Its legal basis was that by becoming
members and binding themselves by the ILO Constitution, all Member States became
obligated to observe the principles as to the four fundamental rights, if not the details as
embodied in the ILO Conventions and Recommendations covering these subjects. The
failure of many large Member States to adopt some of the core labor standards
conventions, therefore, was partially surmounted by adoption of the Declaration,
explicitly binding them to observe the principles at stake. The Declaration subjects
countries to an obligation of annual reporting as to those core Conventions the Member
State has yet to ratify, more systematic and rigorous than the one otherwise applicable to
unratified Conventions, although less stringent than the supervision applicable to ratified,
binding conventions. The Declaration also initiated a system of global annual reports,
rotating, one subject per year, through each of the four areas of fundamental rights.
These reports provide a means to measure global progress towards vindicating these
rights for workers, both comparatively across countries and throughout the world.53
The creation of this supervision system may enhance the motivation for countries
which have not yet ratified core labor conventions to do so, although this hope does not
seem to have produced many results to date. On the other hand, it may be producing
stronger effects at the national level in actual implementation in some countries, or at
least, through the glare of potential publicity, reducing the likelihood of backsliding
among nation-states competing for global capital and jobs provided by multinationals.
The “follow-up” is, however, a process wholly limited to the sunshine effect in terms of
sanctions. Indeed, it is characterized as “promotional,” that is, the Declaration is
designed to function more as a carrot, than a stick.
Moreover, by elevating certain labor standard topics to “core” and “fundamental”
status, the Declaration may implicitly devalue others. It is ironic that during its founding
period, the ILO’s strongest emphasis was on minimum wages, limiting working hours,
and protecting worker health and safety, and in its second period, job security and income
protection were added as subjects of primary concern. These are excluded from the
Declaration, hence from enhanced reporting and monitoring.
B.

Sources Outside the ILO Monitoring and Pressuring for Compliance

Throughout most of the ILO’s history, the only mechanisms for inducing Member
State compliance with their obligations were the ILO’s own reporting and supervision
procedures. Since the ILO system rests almost entirely on hortatory powers of persuasion
rather than coercive or financial remedies to enforce obligations, it has widely been seen
as toothless. Neoliberalism domestically, and free trade internationally have created
increasingly powerful forces undermining domestic efforts to improve, or even maintain

labor standards, both in law and in practice. The comparative weakness of relying wholly
on the “sunshine effect” of public exposure and pressure has led many to question the
modern relevance of the ILO, to urge “linkage” of World Trade Organization
enforcement mechanisms to ILO supervision and monitoring, or to demand changes in
the sanctions for Member States who violate their commitments under binding ILO
instruments.
At the same time, however, other bodies of domestic and international law have
incorporated fundamental ILO standards by reference, leading to sources of sanction
against violations of ILO standards wholly external to the organization itself. The United
States and later the European Community have created preferential trade rules for less
developed countries, adopting General System of Preferences laws which condition
advantageous trade treatment, among other requirements, on these countries’ observance
of specified labor rights.54 At the start of the Clinton administration in 1993, the
negotiation of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the labor
side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), initiated a string
of U.S.-negotiated plurilateral and bilateral free trade agreements which incorporated
labor rights obligations. The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, negotiated in 2000 at
the end of the second term of the Clinton Administration, created a new template for
these provisions, incorporating them within the text of the main trade agreement, placing
them within the enforcement machinery for trade-related violations, and including either
trade sanctions or monetary fines as a remedy for violations. Setting a precedent for
future U.S. free trade agreements, it used ILO standards as the benchmark for the party
countries’ own labor legislation. The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act,55 the
measure authorizing “fast track” (a/k/a “trade promotion authority”), up-or-down voting
for legislative treatment of trade agreements negotiated by the executive and submitted
for Congressional approval and implementation, incorporated this template, as did later
versions of the GSP legislation.56 Finally, as to violations of those labor norms that
constitute fundamental human rights, the Alien Tort Claims Act57 in the U.S. may under
certain circumstances support a civil tort action in domestic U.S. courts, complete with
tort damages running not only against governments, but sometimes against private sector
employers.58
Not only governments but also private actors have created processes leveraging
ILO core standards to legitimate international codes of conduct relying on the threat of
consumer boycotts to pressure multinationals to ensure that their own foreign factories as
well as those of their subcontractors or others in their supply chain bring their
employment policies and practices into conformity.59 In addition, government bodies
such as the U.S. State Department, as well as private nongovernmental organizations
such as Human Rights Watch monitor and issue reports on systematic labor rights
observance or violation in individual countries, and as to specific international labor
standards.60
Thus a decentered network has developed of international, national, public and
private actors using public and private instruments to press employers and nation-state
governments to fulfill the objectives of core ILO standards. This is a part of a much

broader process of development of similar international networks around a wide range of
issues.
Notwithstanding those who celebrate the gradual emergence of such international
governance networks and nodes, however, others are less sanguine about the decline of
democratic control over norm setting and norm enforcement accompanying the decline of
the hegemony of the Member State. In the labor standards area, disquiet is especially
pronounced among those concerned about the increasing power of multinationals relative
both to nation-states and international organizations. The shift in power to global
corporate actors is progressively reducing the ability of nation-states to set and enforce
meaningful labor standards, and of the ILO, trade unions and worker rights NGOs, at
national and international levels, to monitor and press for compliance on the part of both
governments and businesses.
One unintended consequence of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work may be to increase the likelihood of inclusion of these four areas of
labor standards in external measures and instruments such as those mentioned above,
since they have received the heightened international legitimation of constituting
“universal” and “fundamental” rights. Conversely, this may decrease the likelihood of
inclusion of other areas of equal importance for many workers, including some of
longstanding central focus to the ILO such as minimum wages, limitations on working
hours, job security, and social insurance. The U.S., for example, has been inconsistent in
which ILO-derived labor standards it has included in its plurilateral and bilateral free
trade agreements.61
There is also the possibility that as sources of implementation of ILO-derived
labor rights cover more terrain in countries, companies, and industries, and have
intensified enforcement bite, the feedback effect of this may render nation-states more
reluctant to ratify ILO conventions or to vote for adoption of new ones going forward.
C.

Fragmentation of International Labor Standards and Standard-setting

There is another reason for both the dearth of enforcement of internationallyderived labor rights, particularly in developing countries, and problems in persuading
them to ratify labor standards. In developing and less developed countries, the informal
sector makes up a large share of the overall economy, and of overall work possibilities
for the labor force. National legislation regularly exempts such informal businesses from
coverage, rendering labor standards unenforceable for a high proportion of workers.
Moreover, even when the labor law formally applies, the practicalities of enforcement
against marginal employers or in cases of formal self-employment or micro-business is
likely to make the legal rights a dead letter. In areas such as social security, the extreme
fragmentation of the working world in and of itself poses an important barrier to
extension of coverage of basic social insurance schemes to many workers.
The ILO has undertaken an effort to address these sorts of problems with
innovative approaches, which could involve a third way, a negotiated arrangement

between the individual nation-state and the ILO, tailored to address the country’s
obstacles, and coupled with the carrot of technical and perhaps also financial assistance.
The national undertaking would be largely in the nature of goals and timetables, rather
than hard law, contract like obligations, and bears some similarity to elements of the
Open Method of Coordination of the European Union. Whether such an approach, if
adopted, will surmount existing problems, or by producing greater fragmentation in
international labor law, exacerbate enforcement difficulties, remains to be seen.62
D.

Disruption of Unitary Representation at
International and National Levels: Boon or Bane

The predominant role of nation-states in negotiating, adopting, ratifying,
transposing into domestic law, and enforcing international instruments is under
increasing pressure from both above and below; in parallel, the predominant role of trade
unions and of employer associations as functional representatives is under pressure as
their respective representativity declines. From above, pressures on nation-state
sovereignty are manifest in the growing number of international organizations
empowered through their constitutional treaties to adopt international legal measures
binding on Member States, especially international schemes incorporating adjudicatory
bodies empowered to dispositively and bindingly interpret the governing international
legal instruments. From below, international human rights doctrines of individual
claiming rights against nation-states are expanding into individual claiming rights against
multinationals and other private actors. In addition, international NGOs are playing
increasing roles in enforcement of international trade as well as human rights norms, and
are pressing vocally for expanded roles in the negotiation and setting of the standards
themselves. At the functional level, the growing roles of worker rights NGOs and trade
associations are cutting into the previous predominant role of trade unions and employer
associations in unitarily representing workers and employers respectively.
There is some irony in the idea of the ILO negotiating country-by-country
agreements aimed at gradually bringing laggard Member States into compliance with
international standards. During the pre-World War II history of the ILO, few overall
instruments were enacted, while many were adopted on a fragmented basis, industry-byindustry or sector-by-sector. This was viewed as thwarting the basic purpose of taking
minimum standards out of competition, among countries, among industries, and among
companies. The risks of fragmentation and a downward competitive spiral in labor
standards or their application to actual working conditions, may only be aggravated by
the codes of conduct and other NGO initiatives, as well as global and international
collective agreements, which likewise represent a partial return the fragmented approach
of the earlier epoch. They are negotiated to each cover a single multinational company
nad its supply chain, or, less often, a portion of a global industry.
This writer is deeply skeptical about whether these developments merit heralding
as a leading edge towards a new international order with renewed and enhanced power
for workers’ interests. Instead, one cannot help but be concerned about the divide and
conquer potential of fragmentation on all three of the tripartite sides at international as

well as domestic levels. The future of international labor standards may be more formal
standards, covering fewer and fewer countries, companies and workers, posing ever
greater obstacles to turning the law on the books into workers’ reality in fact.
At the same time, innovative trade union and worker organizations are combining
across boundaries to push the limits of transnational labor cooperation, pooling their
economic and political power to improve each other’s collective bargaining power. The
optimistic scenario is that in the end, at least some of the workers of the world will unite,
using their shared collective leverage, coupled with the moral suasion of international
norms, to make a reality of international labor standards.
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